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Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of land rental market development on the 
efficiency of labor allocation and land utilization in rural China. To test the hypothesis 
that the shadow wage of a rent-in household with limited off-farm opportunities will 
increase with the development of a land rental market for households, a statistical 
comparison between the shadow wage and the estimated market wage was conducted. 
The results showed that the shadow wage for both rent-in households and non-rent-in 
households was significantly lower than the market wage, but that the wage for the 
rent-in households was statistically higher than that for non-rent-in households in 
Fenghua and Deqing, the two counties surveyed in this study.  
In addition, the estimated marginal product of farmland for rent-in households was 
statistically higher than the actual land rent that those households paid, while a null 
hypothesis that the actual rental fee accepted by rent-out households is equivalent to the 
marginal product of farmland for those households was not rejected in Fenghua county 
where land transactions by mutual agreement were more prevalent. These results 
indicate that the development of the land rental market facilitates the efficiency of labor 
allocation and farmland utilization in rural China. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The development of a well-functioning land rental market is one of the most 
feasible means to increase factor allocation and raise the efficiency of land use in rural 
areas of developing countries (World Bank 2007, Otsuka 2007). In most of these 
countries, land reform is difficult to implement politically, and the purchase and sale of 
farmland is greatly restricted. By comparison, a land rental market is relatively easy to 
formulate. This is especially true in a developing country experiencing a rapid growth in 
the number of out migrants and off-farm workers. If the households of these migrants 
and off-farm workers are no longer fully utilizing their land because fewer family 
members are available, then land transactions from these households to more able 
farmers not only raises the efficiency of land use, but also accelerates the off-farm 
employment of rural workers. 
Rapid economic growth in China has induced a huge demand for labor from rural 
areas. High productivity in the manufacturing sector has been achieved using cheap 
labor from the rural sector. The amount of migrant labor increased from the end of the 
1980s, and a survey on this labor by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China 
(http://www.stats.gov.cn) showed that the number of rural laborers who had migrated 
from their registered townships for more than six months reached 153 million people in 
2010, accounting for about 30 percent of total rural labor in China. In recent years a 
shortage of physical-labor workers from rural areas has become evident mainly in 
coastal areas such as Shenzhen and Guangzhou, which has pushed up the wages for 
these workers. This has created a debate in the recent literature of whether the Chinese 
economy has passed the Lewis turning point.1 
In contrast to the burgeoning development of China’s urban manufacturing sector, 
development of rural land utilization, notably the rental market for farmland, has lagged. 
At the end of 1990s, the ratio of farmland that was rented in was under 5 percent (MoA 
eds. (2001)). After the abolition of the rural commune system, right of farmland 
utilization was distributed almost equally to rural households, and the Household 
Responsibility System (HRS) was implemented at the beginning of the 1980s. The HRS 
granted households farmland utilization rights in return for meeting certain tax and 
grain quota obligations. Although the HRS raised the incentive for family farmers to 
increase the production of their own farmland, agricultural sector had begun to suffer 
                                                  
1 A special issue on the Lewis turning point in China was published by the China Economic Journal 
(Vol. 3, No. 2, 2010), and the results of a symposium on this topic will be published in the China 
Economic Review. 
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from low productivity since the end of the 1980s (Macmillan et.al (1989), Lin (1992) 
and Wen (1993)). This was mainly due to the diseconomy of small-scale family farming 
and the dysfunction of agricultural extension services.2 
Moreover, Chinese farmers were not eager to rent out farmland since it functioned 
as an important source of social security against unemployment when there were no 
off-farm jobs and in their old age (Dong (1996)). The reallocation of farmland by 
village (xingzheng cun) or village small-group (cunmin xiaozi) in the 1980s and 1990s 
also hindered the development of the land rental market in China. Property rights to 
land were not privatized but vested in villages (xingzheng cun) or village small-groups 
(cunmin xiaozi), and village cadres had reallocated land among households at least once 
and, on average, more than twice. Thus, insecure land transfer rights discouraged 
farmers from investing in agriculture (Carter and Yao (1998), Li, Rozelle and Brandt 
(1998) and Jacoby, Li and Rozelle (2002)). 
However, since the late 1990s the situation in agriculture has begun to change. 
The Chinese government has started to implement a new agricultural policy called 
“agricultural industrialization” (nongye chanye hua). The purpose of this policy is to 
support economic organizations such as agribusiness enterprises, large farmers, and 
rural agricultural cooperatives that integrate small farmers to achieve economies of 
scale and to increase the quality and safety of agricultural products through agricultural 
contracts and extension services. Such agricultural integration has spread widely 
especially in the coastal areas, accompanied by progress in the land rental market 
(World Bank (2006), MoA eds. (2008), Miyata, Minot and Hu (2009) and Lingohr-Wolf 
(2011)). 
This trend is confirmed by the statistical data. According to MoA (2010), the ratio 
of leased-in farmland to total faming area had reached 16 percent in 2009. Data from an 
agricultural census conducted in 2006 showed that the ratio of leased-in farmland was 
over 20 percent for developed coastal provinces such as Shanghai, Zhejiang, and Fujian 
(SC and NBS (2008)). This study investigates the effects of this growing land rental 
market on farm management and recent agricultural development in China. 
There are many studies addressing the mechanism of the farmland lease market in 
China. Yao (2000) theoretically formalize the effect of the imperfect labor market on the 
farmland lease market using a general equilibrium model and household panel data. He 
showed empirically that product heterogeneity and a freer labor market promote more 
land leasing. Carter and Yao (2002) employ an agricultural household model to prove 
                                                  
2 According to a rural household survey by the NBS, the average area of farmland held by a 
household in China during the 1990s was just 0.4-0.6 of a hector. 
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that uncertainty in land transfer rights and high transaction cost prevented efficient 
farmland reallocation through the rental market. Based on the model settings of Carter 
and Yao (2000), Deininger and Jin (2005) and Deininger and Jin (2009a) suggested that 
the land rental market reallocated land to lower endowment but more able households 
which had a bigger effect on agricultural production. Deininger, Jin and Nakarajan 
(2008) applied the same framework for India and concluded that the restrictions on land 
rental transactions negatively affect the productivity and equity of rural households.  
The impacts of off-farm employment on the land rental market have also been 
examined. Kung (2002), using a two-stage IV regression, showed that households 
actively participating in off-farm employment are less likely to rent in farmland. 
Benjamin and Brandt (2002) examined the impact of administrative land reallocation 
and unevenly developed off-farm labor markets on farm efficiency. They concluded that 
inefficiency in labor allocation is alleviated to some extent by administrative land 
reallocation and development of the off-farm labor market. Kimira et al. (2011) also 
empirically suggest that higher off-farm wage rates increase off-farm employment 
opportunities inducing a more active land rental market.3 
However, few studies have tested the efficiency of the land rental market by 
comparing estimated and actual rental fees. Moreover, the theoretical relationship of 
whether land rent-out or rent-in has an effect on the shadow wage of farmers has not 
been explored sufficiently. Farmland leasing tends to be conducted within personal 
networks of kinship and local friends, thus rental fees tend to be very low or not charged 
at all. This made it difficult in former studies to directly estimate allocation efficiency 
through a comparison between actual land fees and estimated ones. 
Since 2003 the Chinese government has enforced a rural land contract law that 
has formalized land transfers. Land transfer centers have been set up to handle the 
registration of land leases, and all lenders and tenants are required to exchange land 
lease contracts within one year, except in the case of substitute farming.4 Formalization 
of the land rental market has developed especially in the coastal areas, as off-farm 
employment has been more pervasive and the motivation to engage in agricultural 
                                                  
3 The main objective of Kimira et al. (2011) was to test the hypothesis that the perception of tenure 
insecurity reduces the likelihood of renting out land. However, the estimation model in their study is 
not constructed to test this hypothesis directly, because a variable which indicates tenure insecurity is 
not included in the estimation model for rent-in or rent-out determination.  
4 The survey for this study indicated that an exchange of lease contract is unlikely in the case of a 
kinship transaction. In Fenghua and Deqing, the two counties surveyed, the ratio for lease contracts 
exchanged was 51% and 78% respectively. Deininger and Jin (2009b) found that implementation of 
the rural land contract law significantly increased the value of compensation for land sold; it also 
prevented illegal land relocation.  
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production decreasing. Therefore this study undertook a rural household survey in 
Zhejiang Province, a coastal area, in 2008 and 2011 to collect information on land lease 
activity. 
The objective of this study is to construct a theoretical agricultural household 
model to test the hypothesis that the development of a land rental market and the rise in 
land rental transactions changes the shadow wage of the household, and to evaluate the 
effect through econometric estimations. The study will also conduct a statistical test 
between the estimated rental fee and the actual one to highlight the characteristics of 
China’s land rental market. The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. Section II 
presents a household model with a land rental market and proposes a testable hypothesis. 
Section III conducts an econometric analysis to test the hypothesis. Section IV 
summarizes the results and indicates implications for agricultural land policy in 
developing countries. 
 
 
II. Theoretical Framework 
 
  Following Yao (1999) and Yao (2000), I assume job opportunity or work time for 
off-farm employment ( wL ) is institutionally limited, and that quantity rationing imposes 
a ceiling in the form of ( ww LL 0 ). This assumption is plausible because of China’s 
Hukou (household registration) system which restricts the movement of population and 
labor from rural to urban areas. The government has been easing these restrictions since 
the middle of the 1980s, but rural households cannot settle permanently in urban areas 
with all of their family members. Also, most migrated workers engage in physical labor 
such as construction, manufacturing and the restaurant sector, and they tend to go back 
to their home villages or retire from off-farm work on reaching around forty years of 
age. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that off-farm employment is rationed. 
I assume a unitary household model with ),( lyUU  , where y is income, l is 
leisure, Uy>0, Ul>0, and U  is strictly concave in y and l. Household income comes 
from three source: agriculture, off-farm work and land rental market. Households 
allocate their labor endowment between their own land AL  and off-farm employment 
WL  at an exogenous wage W . The renting of land has transaction cost TC because of 
the need to collect information on the rental market, to negotiate with latent lenders or 
borrowers, and to enforce rental contracts. Therefore, the lender’s net gain from renting 
out one unit of land is outTCr  , where r is the rental rate, and the tenant’s net cost of 
renting in one unit of land is inTCr  . I assume that transaction cost is not the same 
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between renting in and renting out since renting in land involves a relatively large 
amount of investment. 
The decision of a representative rural household to rent in or rent out land can be 
modeled as follows:5 
 
Max     ),( lyUU                                         (1) 
s. t. w
ininoutout
AA wLTTCrITTCrITLpQy  21 )()(),(            (2) 
lLLL wA                                          (3) 
ww LL 0                                               (4) 
12 TTTTA                                          (5) 
 
where p denotes the price of agricultural goods, Q denotes the production function of 
agriculture with inputs of AT (operational land size) and AL (amount of agricultural 
labor), L  and T  are labor and land endowments respectively, 1T  is the amount of 
rented-out land, 2T  is the amount of rent-in land. outI is an indicator for renting out (1 
for rent-out, 0 otherwise), inI is an indicator renting in (1 for rent-in, 0 otherwise) . 
This model yields the following first order condition (FOC) of LA.   
0 wUQpU yLy A           (6) 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint on wL . I now define shadow wage 
( sw ) as: 
s
y
L wU
wQp
A
              (7) 
This indicates that sw  is smaller than w  if off-farm employment is constrained, and 
the marginal productivity of agricultural labor is less than wage rate. In this model, I 
assume that sw  is strictly positive to ensure that an interior solution of LA and equality 
in equation (7) hold. Equation (7) also indicates that the shadow wage approaches the 
wage rate if the rationing of off-farm employment is reduced.  
As Yao (2000) shows, the effect of AL  on shadow wage is deduced from the 
partial differential in equation (7).  
 
 
                                                  
5 Yao (2000) includes wage labor for own agriculture as a variable of household income. He 
assumes that the level of the shadow wage of the household is less than that of agricultural labor, 
thus the household will not hire outside labor. For the purpose of simplifying the setting, I do not 
introduce agricultural wage labor. 
9 
 
0)(2 
 wpQU
UL
w
ALyy
yA
s      (8) 
This is because yyU  is negative and )( wQp AL   is non-positive. In order to clarify 
the relationship of sw , w , and AL , Figure 1 depicts the labor allocation of the 
household. The vertical axis is the wage rate or marginal product of agricultural labor, 
and the horizontal axis is the amount of agricultural labor. If the labor market works 
perfectly, the amount of labor is determined at a node of the wage rate and marginal 
product. In my model, the optimal amount of agricultural labor is more than that of the 
perfect market because of off-farm labor rationing.  
 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
 
Looking next at the determinants of the decision to rent in or rent out land and the 
effect of land rental on the level of the shadow wage, if the land rental market is perfect, 
the amount of land rented in or rented out is decided only by the land rental fee. 
However, the renting of land comes with transaction cost as assumed in equation (2). 
The first order condition of land for T1 and T2 are shown as follows: 
T1 (rent-out; outI =1 and inI =0): 
  0)((,0)( 1  outToutT TCrQpTTCrQp AA  
thus 01 T if )( outT TCrQp A    
01 T if )( outT TCrQp A   
T2 (rent-in; inI =1 and outI =0):  
  0)((,0)( 2  inTinT TCrQpTTCrQp AA  
thus 02 T if )( inT TCrQp A   
02 T if )( inT TCrQp A   
This indicates that the household decision to participate in the land rental market is 
determined by the relationship between the marginal product of land and the real rental 
fee. Based on the FOCs, we can divide households into three exclusive regimes as 
follows: 
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Rent-out ( 01 T ): )( outT TCrQp A   
Autarkic ( 021  TT ): )()( inTout TCrQpTCr A       (9) 
Rent-in ( 02 T ): )( inT TCrQp A   
It is clear from these equations that the number of autarkic households expands 
with the increase in transaction cost. Assuming these equations to be the condition of 
the regimes, the marginal product of land for the rent-out household must be less than 
the real rent. The effect of the increase in land rent-out on the level of the shadow wage 
is derived from the partial differential of equation (7). 
   
0
)(
)(
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2
1
1
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
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U
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T
T
w AA 

Using the same procedure, the effect of the increase in land rent-in is obtained as 
follows: 
   
0
)(
)(
)(
2
2
2

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T
T
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These two equations imply that the more the amount of land rented in (rented out), 
the higher the level of the shadow wage. It needs to be remembered, however, that 
participation in the land rental market induces a shift in the marginal product of 
agricultural labor, thus the equilibriums of labor allocation and the shadow wage are 
shown in Figure 2. The shadow wage of the rent-in household surges from SW  to SW  , 
and at the same time the marginal product of agricultural labor also shifts upward from 
0MP  to 1MP . Therefore, the intersection point of the two curves changes from A to B, 
and the optimal amount of the shadow wage always rises compared with that at point A; 
but that of agricultural labor is uncertain since it is dependent on the degree of shift in 
the two curves. For the rent-out household, the optimal level of agricultural labor at 
point D always decreases compared with that at point A, while the degree of the optimal 
shadow wage is not certain. From these conjectures, I make the following hypothesis. 
 
(Insert Figure 2 here) 
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Hypothesis: An increase in rent-in land will always increase the amount of the shadow 
wage toward approaching the off-farm wage. On the other hand, an increase in rent-out 
land will always decrease the quantity of agricultural labor. 
 
 
III. Description of the Dataset and Estimation Strategy 
 
(1)  Sampling Design and Dataset 
  We conducted questionnaire surveys of rural household in two counties of Zhejiang 
Province, Fenghua City (a county-level city) and Deqing County, with the help of the 
Department of Public Management of Zhejiang University.6 The survey in Fenghua 
was carried out in August 2008, and that in Deqing was done in January 2011. Fenghua 
City is in the southern part of the province and Deqing County is in the north. 
Manufacturing such as electronics, clothing and food processing is relatively developed 
in both counties, and both have a relatively productive agricultural sector which has 
been shifting from traditional grains (rice and wheat) to raising more commercialize 
agricultural products such as fruits (peaches, strawberries, mulberries), bamboo shoots, 
tea plants and the breeding for oysters and fish.  
  Sample households were selected using the multi-stage stratified random sampling 
method. First, the total size of the sample was set at 450 households in each county. 
Then three representative townships (xiang) or rural cities (zhen) in each county were 
select, in each of which three to five villages were randomly chosen. Sample households 
were selected in advance from the list of households registered in each village based on 
systematic sampling method. If a selected household was absent at the time of the 
survey, a substitute households, also selected beforehand, was interviewed by 
enumerators. Because of a disparity between the counties in the average number of 
people per village, we adjusted the sampling ratio for each county, selecting five 
villages from each township and thirty households in Fenghua, and three villages and 
fifty households in Deqing.7 The total number of surveyed households was 450 in 
Fenghua and 442 in Deqing. 
   Table 1 provides the survey statistics. The average household size and the number of 
workers in Fenghua was less than in Deqing. The percentage of workers engaged in 
                                                  
6 Financing for these household surveys came from a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (GIASR) 
from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, and from the Japan 
Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) [GIASR, # 20252007]. 
7 The average number of people per village in the surveyed areas was 278 for Fenghua and 517 for 
Deqing. 
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agriculture as their principal job was relatively low, standing at less than a third in both 
counties. A much higher percentage worked in off-farm jobs in manufacturing, 
commerce and the service sector. The per capita income in Fenghua was a little less than 
that in Deqing. The average per capita income of a rural household in Zhejiang Province 
was 8,265 yuan in 2007, which implies that the living standard of our sample 
households was relatively higher than that of the average Zhejiang rural household. 
 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
 
Looking at the farmland statistics, the average area of contracted farmland 
(chengbao di) in Fenghua was 2.64 mu per household, comparatively less than the 3.77 
mu in Deqing, although the Gini coefficient for contracted farmland was relatively low 
and almost the same for the two counties.8 However, there was a large gap between the 
two in the average size of total farmland, which included woodlands and orchards; the 
average was 4.93 mu for Fenghua compared to 8.12 mu for Deqing. The difference was 
mainly due to the area of cultivated land and woodlands; the area of cultivated land in 
Fenghua was almost half that of Deqing, and that of woodlands was less than a third. 
The average area of rent-out farmland was 0.84 mu in Fenghua and 1.55 mu in Deqing, 
which accounted for about 20 percent of total farmland. The average area of rent-in land 
was much higher in Fenghua, mainly because a few households had rented in large 
amounts of farmland (70-80 mu) from outside their villages. Excluding those 
households, the average area of rent-in farmland in Fenghua came to 1.46 mu. 
A point to note was some difference between the two counties in the method of 
land rental. All land rentals in Fenghua were by mutual agreement. While such 
agreements were also prevalent in Deqing, slightly less than half of land rentals were 
carried out through the direct intervention of a village committee or village small-group 
and were called a “collective subcontract” (fanzu daobao). This method meant that the 
village committee used its administrative authority initially to collect the land-use rights 
from the villagers and then redistribute those rights collectively to specific rentees such 
as large farmers and agribusiness enterprises. According to interviews with village 
cadres, all of the village committees supported the development of land rentals, however 
it appeared that such direct intervention in land transfers was conducted more among 
the villages in the mountains of Deqing.  
 
 
                                                  
8 1 mu equals about 6.66 acres, and 15 mu equals 1 hectare. 
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(2)  Characteristics of the Land Rental Market 
Table 2 summarizes the patterns of rent-in/rent-out land transactions in the 
surveyed areas. The “✓” sign indicates the households that engaged in the renting in 
and/or renting out of farmland, and “X” indicates the households that did not. The ratios 
of autarkic households that neither rented in nor rented out were 39 percent for Fenghua 
and 34 percent for Deqing. The ratio of rent-out households was 34 percent for Fenghua, 
rather lower than the 53 percent for Deqing. The average area of total farmland for these 
households in Fenghua was just 1.7 mu, implying that most of these households rented 
out the whole of their farmland.9 The percentage of rent-in households was much 
higher in Fenghua than in Deqing, but the average area of farmland for these households 
in Fenghua was smaller, especially among the households that only rented in, which 
averaged 9.9 mu, much less than the 18.7 mu for such households in Deqing. The ratio 
of the households that engaged in both renting in and renting out was about the same in 
both counties. The statistical results indicate that farmland concentration through rental 
transactions has progressed more in Deqing, but many agricultural households in both 
counties actively engaged in these transactions. 
 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
Basic information on land rental contracts is summarized in Table 3. For rent-out 
households in Deqing, the average rental fee was higher and the average period of 
contract much longer than in Fenghua, whether through subcontract or collective 
subcontract. At the same time, the ratio of rent-out households that took no rental fee 
was much smaller in Deqing than in Fenghua. The same characteristics were observable 
for renting in. The percentage of rent-in households in Deqing that did not pay a rental 
fee was just 8 percent, much less than the 48 percent in Fenghua. This suggests that land 
rental is conducted on a more regular basis in Deqing.  
 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
 
There were differences between the two counties in the content of rental contracts. 
The average size of rent-in farmland in Fenghua was much smaller, and the average 
rental fee was a little higher. But in both counties the average fee to rent in farmland 
                                                  
9 The ratio of rent-out households that rented out all of their farmland was 65 percent in Fenghua 
and 16 percent in Deqing, which explains the large difference between the two counties in the 
average area of farmland held by rent-out households. 
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was lower than that to rent out. This seems to have been due partially to discounts by 
the village committees to facilitate land transactions. But differences in the quality of 
land also likely played a role in the gap between rent-out and rent-in fees.10 
 
(3)  Estimation Strategy11 
To test the hypothesis examined in Section II, this section will perform a 
three-step estimation procedure. The first step will use a probit model to estimate the 
determinant of whether or not a household participates in the land rental market. As 
explained in equation (9), the difference between the marginal product of agriculture 
and the real rental fee determines the land rental regime of each household. However, 
the number of households that rented out part of their farmland and also maintain their 
own agricultural production was very limited which made it hard to obtain robust results 
from the production function estimations. Therefore, the households were separated into 
two regimes: whether farmland was rented in or not, and the determinants of renting in 
farmland were analyzed.12 The probit model is then specified as:  
)exp(
)exp(
)(Prob
212,1
21
jjjhj
jjjh
h
VX
VX
jz 


      (10) 
where hz  is an indicator variable denoting the choice for household h about the type of 
regime j (rent-in=1, non-rent-in=2), hX  is a vector for household attributes, V is a 
vector for village attributes representing the level of rental fee and transaction cost in 
the land market, and 1j  and 2j  are vectors of coefficients to be estimated.  
In the second step, a Cobb-Douglas production function for agriculture to adjust 
for selection bias will be estimated for each regime. To control for the effects of the 
household’s decision on land renting, a two-stage procedure is adopted in which a 
correction term hj  compiled from the estimation results of equation (10) is added as a 
regressor. The production function is then specified as follows: 
 
hjhjj
k
kjkjhhjjhjjhjjijhj VcXMTLY    lnlnlnln 321  (11) 
 
                                                  
10 The survey was not organized to evaluate the quality of land, thus it did not examine directly the 
effect of land quality on rental fees. 
11 The estimation strategy is based on that of Carter and Yao (2002), Deininger and Jin (2005) 
and Kurosaki and Khan (2006). 
12 The results of the multinomial logit model for each type of regime j (rent-out=1, autarky=2, and 
rent-in=3) are shown in the Appendix. 
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where hjY  is the gross output of agriculture (total output of crop, animal and fish 
farming), hjL  is the total amount of labor in agriculture, hjT  is the total area of 
farmland utilized for agricultural production, hjM  is the total amount of agricultural 
input cost (including fertilizer and pesticide purchase, irrigation, and fees to rent 
machinery for cultivation), jX  is a vector of household characteristics that affect 
agricultural productivity,  kjV  is village dummy, and ij  is an i.i.d error term. 
Parameters to be estimated are  ,,,,, 321  and vector c . 
   The third step is estimating the shadow wage ( SW ) which is difficult to do directly 
since it requires a lot of information on household attributes and strong assumptions on 
the form of the utility function. Thus, instead of estimating the shadow wage directly, I 
will calculate the marginal product of agricultural labor, which can be regarded as the 
lower limit of the shadow wage as shown in equation (2). The marginal product of 
agricultural labor is calculated using the estimated parameters in equation (14) as 
follows: 
hA
h
hA
h
A
h
hA
h
L
Y
L
Y
L
Y
MPL
L
Y  






1ln
ˆln      (12) 
 
where hY

 is a fitted value of gross output. The same procedure is used to estimate the 
marginal product of land. These values will then be compared with the nonfarm market 
wage and the actual rental fee.  
In order to compare the value of the shadow wage with that of the market wage, 
the Mincerian wage function for wage labor, including non-agricultural self 
employment, is estimated. Here ihW  is regressed on ihX  and V  where ihW  is the 
wage level of individual i of household h, and ihX  is the human capital of the 
employee. To control for bias occurring from self selection of whether or not a person 
should engage in wage employment, a two-stage procedure is adopted in which a 
correction term, the so-called inverse Mill’s ratio, is added as an additional regressor. 
The Micearian wage function is specified as:  
 
ih
k
kkihihih VXW   ˆln    (13) 
 
where  is a vector of coefficients, ihˆ  is the term of the inverse Mill’s ratio,   is a 
coefficient, and ih  is a zero-mean error term. The fitted values of the wage function 
for all individuals, including those who do not engage in wage employment, are 
calculated, and the average of the fitted value is reckon by household. I regard this 
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household average as the wage rate which represents the expected wage if a person 
engages in wage employment. To test the hypothesis, a statistical comparison between 
the shadow wage and expectation wage will be conducted in the next section. 
 
 
IV Estimation Results 
 
(1)  Descriptive Statistics and Result of Probit Model  
The variables in vector hX  include characteristics of the household head such as 
age, age squared, years of education completed, China Communist Party membership 
dummy and health index (3=very good, 2=good, 1=not good). Also included are 
variables representing attributes of household production endowments such as size of 
contracted land, total number of workers engaged in production activities, ratio of 
higher education, the child dummy (0-5 years old), and the old age dummy (more than 
75 years old). Since the values of the rental fee and transaction cost are determined by 
village attributes, I have incorporated the Gini coefficient of contracted land, total size 
of cultivated land, geographic conditions (plain, hilly, mountainous), and average wage 
of temporary agricultural work as vector V. 
The descriptive statistics of these variables for both counties are shown in Table 4. 
In Fenghua, the averages for contracted land, total workers, age and health index are 
statistically different for rent-in and non-rent-in households. In Deqing, the averages for 
only two variables (total workers and old age dummy) are statistically different for such 
households, which mean that the basic attributes of rent-in and non-rent-in households 
in Deqing are more similar. 
 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 
The lower half of Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for the production 
function. All of the averages for the agricultural inputs and outputs of rent-in 
households are statistically higher than those of non-rent-in households in both counties. 
This indicates that rent-in households tended to conduct more commercialized 
agricultural production. Since the log-likelihood test that all of the elasticity for 
agricultural inputs is the same for rent-in and non-rent-in households is rejected at 1 
percent level in both counties, the production function will be estimated by the type of 
land rental.  
Table 5 provides the estimation results for the probit model on the decision to rent 
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in land. In Fenghua, the parameter of years of education is statistically negative, 
meaning that more educated households were less likely to rent-in farmland. The size of 
contracted land and the child dummy also had a negative effect on the rent-in decision. 
On the other hand, the total number of workers, level of the Gini coefficient and 
geographic features had a positive effect on the rent-in decision. These suggest that the 
households in Fenghua with less favorable agricultural conditions tended to rent in 
farmland. 
 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 
Compared with Fenghua, the estimated results for Deqing were less distinct. The 
total number of workers and years of education completed were significant, and the 
signs of these variables were the same as those for Fenghua. The old age dummy had a 
negative effect on rent-in, indicating that households needing to care for a child were 
not likely to participate in the land rental market. All of the variables for village 
characteristics were not significant, a result suggesting that village features in Deqing 
were not important factors for a household’s decision to rent in. This result seems 
related to the fact that direct intervention in land rentals by village committees was more 
prevalent in Deqing. 
 
(2)  Production and Wage Functions 
Estimations of the production functions of rent-in and non-rent-in households are 
shown in Table 6. The elasticities of input variables for rent-in households are mostly 
significant, and that for farmland displays a high number reflecting land scarcity in 
Zhejiang agriculture. The elasticity of input cost for Deqing is higher, which implies 
that the county’s rent-in farmers conduct more input-cost intensive agriculture. The 
sums of elasticities are 1.01 for Fenghua and 1.26 for Deqing. The coefficients of the 
correction term are not significant for both counties, thus the selection bias on the type 
of land rental is not serious for the estimated results. While the results for non-rent-in 
households are generally the same as those for rent-in ones, the coefficients of the 
correction term are not significant, that of input cost is the highest of all inputs, and the 
sum of elasticities for three inputs is slightly over one. However, the elasticity of labor 
and the parameters of household characteristics (age and education) are not significant 
for Fenghua.  
 
(Insert Table 6 here) 
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The marginal products of agricultural labor and farmland can now be calculated 
based on the estimated parameters. To compare the marginal product of labor with the 
market wage, the wage functions are estimated with the selection term specified in 
equation (11). The explanatory variables included are age, age squared, education level, 
female dummy, and the inverse Mill’s ratio. Education level has two parts: educational 
stage dummies (primary school, junior high school, high school and university) and 
years of education completed. The results of model 1, shown in Table 7, suggest that 
workers with a junior high school education are paid 32% and 10%, and those with a 
high school education are paid 45% and 24% more than non-literate workers in Fenghua 
and Deqing respectively. The Mincearian rates of education for Fenghua and Deqing in 
model 2 are 3.1% and 2.1% respectively. According to earlier studies, such as Knight, 
Deng and Li (2011) and Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002), the return on education in 
rural China is generally lower than that in other countries, thus the estimated results 
found in this study appear to be consistent with the previous literature.  
 
(Insert Table 7 here) 
 
The parameter of the inverse Mill’s ratio is significant for Fenghua but not for 
Deqing, indicating that selection bias for the latter is not serious. Looking at the results 
of other human capital variables, the linear and quadric terms of age, a proxy for job 
experience, are positive and negative for both counties, implying that the wages of 
nonfarm jobs positively increase with experience but at a diminishing rate; and the 
female dummy for both counties is significantly negative, which suggests that wage 
rates for female workers are lower than those for male workers by about 25% for 
Fenghua and 35% for Deqing. 
 
(3)  Statistical Test for Labor and Land Market  
I estimated the fitted value of the wage function and calculate the arithmetic 
average of this value in terms of a household’s expected market wage as a value of 
off-farm work. A comparison of the marginal product of agricultural labor (a proxy for 
the shadow wage) with the estimated market wage was conducted using parametric 
(t-test for a paired and unpaired sample) and non-parametric (Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test) tests.  
The results of the tests are summarized in Table 8. The marginal product of 
agricultural labor was significantly lower than the expected market wage in both the 
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paired t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test regardless of counties and the type of land 
rental, but the gap was much smaller for rent-in households. For rent-in households in 
Fenghua, the mean value for the marginal product of agricultural labor was 861 yuan, 
while that for the estimated market wage was 1191 yuan. The gap was much larger for 
non-rent-in households in Fenghua, indicating that the mean value for the marginal 
product of agricultural labor was only 72 yuan. The result was the same for Deqing, 
although the gap was less apparent than for Fenghua.  
 
(Insert Table 8 here) 
 
The results of the t-test showed that the marginal product of agricultural labor for 
rent-in households was significantly higher than that for non-rent-in households at the 1 
percent level in both counties. These results support the hypothesis that the increase in 
rent-in land increases the amount of shadow wage toward approaching the off-farm 
wage. 
A comparison of the marginal product of farmland with the actual rental fee was 
also performed and the results are shown in the lower half of Table 8. Where the survey 
found that the value of the actual rental fee was missing or the land was rented free of 
charge, those observations were excluded from the comparison test. The mean values 
for the marginal product of land for rent-in household was 1812 yuan for Fenghua and 
865 yuan for Deqing, significantly much higher than the actual rental fees, which 
indicates that rent-in households obtain a large income from renting farmland for 
agricultural production.  
For non-rent-in households, the mean values for the same two variables were 
much more similar. This was especially true for Fenghua where there was no statistical 
difference in the paired sample t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test, although the actual 
rental fee was significantly higher than the marginal product in Deqing.13 Thus, it 
appears that the rental fee on rent-in farmland in Fenghua was determined so as to 
reflect the marginal product of farmland. While in Deqing it was determined so as to 
favor rent-out households to compensate for involuntary land transactions. However, it 
must be kept in mind that the tests were performed on a limited number of observations, 
since the group forming the non-rent-in households included both autarky and rent-out 
households. Moreover, of the households in Fenghua that rented out land, most of them 
                                                  
13 The tests were conducted by dividing rent-out households into types (subcontract and collective 
subcontract). The results were the same for both types. This suggests that the type of renting out does 
not to directly affect the level of rental fee.  
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rented out all of their farmland; only 28 households among the rent-out households 
engaged in agricultural production renting out part of their farmland. 
The disparity in the marginal product of land between rent-in and non-rent-in 
households can be interpreted by the monopsonistic (demand monopolistic) model for 
the land rental market involving higher transaction cost. Up to now in this study it has 
been assumed that rental fee r  is decided exogenously, however the theoretical model 
in this study can be extended to allow the rental fee to be determined by the equilibrium 
of the land rental market. Yao (2000), Deininger and Jin (2005), and Deininger and Jin 
(2009a) proposed a theoretical framework to examine the equilibrium of land market 
clearance and the endogenous determinants of the rental fee. Their models are 
informative and theoretically sophisticated, but it is difficult for these models to explain 
why the marginal product of land for rent-in household is much higher than the actual 
rental fee and why the difference is so small for non-rent-in household. 
  For this reason I will briefly present a monopsonistic model for the land rental 
market to explain the characteristics of that market in Zhejiang Province. To examine 
the endogenous rent rate, two assumptions are added to equation (9). First, the 
aggregated supply curve of land rent-out is assumed to be less elastic to price in 
Fenghua than in Deqing. As mentioned, the size of farmland as well as the amount of 
gross agricultural income in Fenghua was smaller, and almost half of rent-in households 
did not pay rental fee. Thus, less willingness to cultivate farmland stimulates households 
in Fenghua to rent out farmland, and the slope of supply curve tents to be steeper. 
   The second assumption is that the number of latent tenants for land is strictly limited 
and actual tenants have monopsonistic control over the rate of rent. Although more 
commercialized and intensive agricultural production has the potential to earn more 
profit, it requires large amounts of investment to improve land conditions and purchase 
agricultural machinery. In addition, investment in agriculture involves relatively higher 
risk because of price fluctuations and weather conditions. This could be expressed in a 
higher level of inTC , which prevents ordinary farmers from renting in farmland. As 
pointed out above, the percentage of households that rent in land is lower, and they rent 
relatively large amounts of farmland ranging from twice to three times the contracted 
land distributed by villages or village small-groups. Thus, ordinary farmers show little 
willingness to invest in more differentiated agricultural production. For the purpose of 
simplifying the model, the shapes of demand curves are assumed be the same in 
Fenghua and Deqing.  
   The relationship of aggregated demand and supply for farmland is depicted in 
Figure 3, which means that the amount of land rented in is determined by the point 
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where the demand curve and marginal factor cost (MFC) curve intersect. Since tenants 
have monopsonistic control over the rental fee reflecting their marginal revenue of 
farmland, the optimal amount of farmland for monopsonistic rent-in households is T , 
which is less than that of the non- monopsonistic market equilibrium of T . Meanwhile 
the level of the rental fee of rent-out households in a monopsonistic market is 
determined at outr , which is less than that of r , so tenants are able to obtain excess 
revenue from rent-in farmland. But the tenants’ monopsonistic control was mitigated in 
Deqing where the supply curve is less steep than that of Fenghua and rental fee was a 
little raised by administrative interventions in land transactions. 
 
(Insert Figure 3 here) 
 
  These implications from this monopsonistic model are consistent with this study’s 
estimated results. Thus, in order to develop further studies on land rental markets, we 
need to examine the bargaining power between lenders and tenants and to accumulate 
statistical estimations from actual situations in developing countries. 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
   This paper investigated the impact of land rental market development on the 
efficiency of labor allocation and land utilization in rural China based on a household 
survey conducted by this study in the counties of Fenghua and Deqing in Zhejiang 
Province. The study constructed a simply agricultural household model and set up a 
hypothesis that the shadow wage of rent-in households with limited off-farm 
opportunities will increase with the development of the land rental market for 
households whose marginal product of farmland is higher than the real rental fee.  
   To test this hypothesis, the study first estimated a probit model of whether a 
household rents in farmland or not, and estimated the agricultural production functions 
with a sample selection term to deduce the marginal product of agricultural labor. The 
study then conducted a statistical comparison between the shadow wage and the 
estimated market wage based on the Mincerian wage function to control for sample 
selection bias. The results showed that the shadow wage of both rent-in and non-rent-in 
households was significantly lower than the market wage, but the wage of rent-in 
households was statistically higher than that of non-rent-in households in both Fenghua 
and Deqing counties. These results are consistent with the study’s hypothesis. 
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Moreover, the estimated marginal product of farmland for rent-in households was 
statistically higher than the actual land rent that rent-in household paid, while a null 
hypothesis that the actual rental fee accepted by rent-out households is equivalent to the 
marginal product of farmland for those households was not rejected for Fenghua, but 
was for Deqing. These results indicate that rent-in households exhibit monopsonistic 
power to restrain the land rental fee at the opportunity cost of land use in each village, 
and they obtain excess profit from more commercialized agricultural production, 
although they face numerous risks by investing in agricultural.  
The findings of this study suggest that the development of the land rental market 
facilitates the efficiency of labor allocation and farmland utilization in rural China, and 
policy supports for reducing transaction cost and risks indigenous to agriculture would 
be effective in weakening the monopsonistic power of tenants and improving overall 
economic welfare in rural areas. 
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Figure 1 Agricultural Labor and Wage under an Imperfect Labor Market 
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Figure 2  Effect of Land Transactions on the Shadow Wage 
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Figure 3  Monopsonistic Model for a Land Rental Market 
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Table 1  Characteristics of Sample Households by County 
 
Fenghua Deqing
Number of sample households 450 442
Household size 3.32 4.38
Amount of household labor 2.16 2.70
Employment (%)
   Agriculture 30 23
   Mining 0 6
   Manufacturing 35 28
   Construction and Transportation 9 12
   Commerce and Services 14 24
Per capita Income in 2007 prices 12,723 15,474
Size of contracted land (mu) 2.64 3.77
Gini Coefficient of contracted land 0.32 0.33
Total Farmland (mu) 4.93 8.12
    Cultivated land 1.59 3.17
        Paddy field 0.92 2.22
    Woodlands 0.78 3.16
    Orchards 0.91 0.30
    Other 1.64 1.48
Gini Coefficient of total farmland 0.67 0.63
Rent-out (mu) 0.84 1.55
    Collective subcontract 0.00 0.89
Rent-in (mu) 2.28 1.53  
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Table 2  Pattern of Land Transactions 
 
Ratio of
households
Average
farmland
Ratio of
households
Average
farmland
(%) (mu) (%) (mu)
X X 39 3.4 34 6.7
X ✓ 34 1.7 53 4.5
✓ X 22 9.9 7 18.7
✓ ✓ 4 18.7 6 20.7
100 4.9 100 7.2Total
Deqing
rent-in rent-out
Fenghua
 
(Note) 1)The sign “✓” indicates that the households conduct the renting in/renting out of farmland, 
and “x” indicates that the households do not. 
2) Two households whose total farmland was over 100 mu were removed from the 
estimation. 
 
 
Table 3  Basic Characteristics of Land Rental Contracts 
 
Average S. D. Average S. D.
Fenghua Subcontract 127 374 0.40 27% 61 305 0.62 48%
Subcontract 143 539 0.30 4%
Collective
subcontact 100 498 0.22 0%
Percentage of
non-monerary
transaction
rental fee (RMB) Percentage
of non-
monerary
t ti
0.63 8%Deqing 253
rent-out
Land rental form Number ofhouseholds
Number of
households
rent-in
45
rental fee (RMB)
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Table 4  Descriptive Statistics of the Estimation Data 
 
(1) Descriptive statistics of the Probit model
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Mean Std. Dev. Mean
contracted land (mu) 2.40 1.17 2.83 1.75 ** 3.88 2.12 3.90 3.51
total workers 2.35 0.93 2.10 1.05 ** 3.11 0.98 2.63 1.08 ***
age 52.26 8.76 55.70 10.97 *** 51.27 9.24 51.40 11.32
education (years) 6.65 2.69 7.00 2.91 6.43 3.45 6.49 3.46
CCP dummy 0.18 0.38 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.13 0.34
ratio of high education 0.16 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.13 0.18 0.12
child dummy 0.09 0.29 0.15 0.36 0.23 0.43 0.20 0.40
old age dummy 0.11 0.32 0.18 0.39 0.13 0.33 0.30 0.46 ***
health index 2.60 0.64 2.41 0.75 ** 2.77 0.50 2.65 0.60
Nos
(2) Descriptive statistics of the agricultural production function
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Mean Std. Dev. Mean
age 53.2 8.2 58.5 10.1 *** 51.366 7.732 51.163 10.608
education (year) 6.2 2.7 6.3 2.9 6.366 3.300 6.226 3.410
output (RMB) 23,554 17,981 5,795 6,964 *** 51,214 72,003 16,246 40,219 ***
farmland (mu) 7.5 6.8 3.7 2.6 *** 19 18 7 7 ***
agricultural labor (months) 10.7 7.6 7.9 6.0 *** 15 10 9 7 ***
input (RMB) 3,553 2,899 1,380 1,634 *** 19,927 33,721 5,901 19,128 ***
Nos
96 287
non-rent-in
Std. Dev.
56 366
rent-in rent-innon-rent-in
Std. Dev.
Fenghua Deqing
Fenghua Deqing
rent-in non-rent-in rent-in non-rent-in
Std. Dev. Std. Dev.
66 107 41 190  
Notes: *** and ** indicate statistical significance of t-test at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
Table 5  Estimation Results of Probit Model 
Contracted land -0.158 *** 0.005
(-2.835) (0.219)
Number of total workers 0.184 0.222 ***
(2.172) (3.085)
Age 0.089 0.078
(1.007) (1.179)
Age*Age -0.001 -0.001
(-1.205) (-1.240)
Years of education -0.054 * -0.013
(-1.736) (-0.475)
CCP Dummy 0.011 0.436 *
(0.056) (1.901)
Ratio of higher education -0.342 -0.455
(-0.615) (-0.641)
Child Dummy 1 -0.517 ** -0.003
(0-4) (-2.092) (-0.017)
Old age Dummy 0.038 -0.473 **
(0.135) (-2.071)
Health index 0.132 0.221
(1.129) (1.486)
Land Gini 9.043 *** -0.541
(2.629) (-0.128)
Village wage rate -0.010 0.008
(-1.534) (0.817)
Cultivated land per household -1.109 -0.272
(-1.575) (-0.696)
Geographic dummy (hilly) 2.316 *** -0.362
(4.298) (-0.804)
Geographic dummy (mountainous) 2.202 *** -0.476
(3.969) (-0.784)
Intercept -6.792 -3.855
(-2.481) (-1.559)
Observations
Wald test
Pseudo R2 0.089
Fenghua Deqing
coefficient coefficient
383 422
58.65*** 29.52**
0.181  
Notes: Values of z-statistics are shown in parentheses; *** significant at 1% level, ** at 5% 
level, and * at 10% level. 
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Table 6  Estimated Results of Production Function 
 
Age 0.306 * -0.103 -0.033 -0.034
(1.917) (-1.549) (-0.292) (-0.583)
Age*Age -0.003 ** 0.001 0.000 0.000
(-2.015) (1.560) (0.351) (0.505)
Years of education -0.060 -0.010 0.051 0.015
(-1.561) (-0.428) (1.592) (0.685)
Log of Land 0.499 *** 0.382 *** 0.477 ** 0.309 **
(4.100) (3.027) (2.347) (2.162)
Log of Labor 0.275 ** 0.083 0.193 0.371 ***
(2.269) (0.871) (1.024) (3.485)
Log of Agricultural Input 0.249 ** 0.685 *** 0.589 *** 0.518 ***
(2.497) (8.874) (4.447) (5.935)
Selection correction 1.011 -1.639 0.381 -0.859
(0.532) (-0.997) (0.157) (-0.578)
Intercept 0.301 7.584 *** 3.953 5.365 ***
(0.076) (2.910) (1.332) (2.349)
Observations
F test
Adjusted  R2
non-rent-in
0.762 0.761 0.747 0.522
Fenghu Deqing
rent-in non-rent-in rent-in
66 107 41 190
11.98*** 29.71*** 8.87*** 16.36***
 
Notes: 1) Values of t-statistics with robust stander error are reported in the parentheses; *** 
significant at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
      2) The results of Village dummy are omitted from the table. 
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Table 7  Estimated Results of Wage Functions 
Age 0.115 *** 8.408 *** 0.106 *** 0.098 ***
(8.387) (8.404) (8.309) (8.079)
Age*Age -0.002 *** -9.613 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 ***
(-9.641) (-9.601) (-8.649) (-8.444)
Primary school 0.306 ** -0.048
(2.409) (-0.474)
Junior high school 0.281 ** 0.102
(2.127) (0.895)
High school 0.373 ** 0.214 *
(2.555) (1.721)
University 0.718 *** 0.265 *
(4.063) (1.820)
Years of education 0.031 *** 0.021 **
(2.972) (2.360)
Female Dummy -0.308 *** -0.298 *** -0.441 *** -0.439 ***
(-5.791) (-5.585) (-9.237) (-9.156)
Inverse Mill's Ratio 0.272 ** 0.289 ** 0.230 0.225
(2.127) (2.237) (1.055) (1.072)
Intercept 5.032 *** 5.124 *** 5.461 *** 5.553 ***
(15.04) (15.32) (18.17) (18.79)
Wald χ2
Observations
Censored
Uncensored
Fenghua Deqing
189.00*** 171.12*** 156.58*** 149.52***
640
298
826
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
954
314
1124
 
Notes: 1) Values of t-statistics are reported in the parentheses with *** significant at 1% level, ** at 
5% level, and * at 10% level. 
      2) Included as regressors of 1st stage estimation are variables on age, educational level (two 
specifications), female dummy, marriage dummy, CCP (China Communist Party) dummy, 
Hukou dummy, Health index, household characteristics (Child dummy 1 (0-4 years old), 
Child dummy 2 (5-9), Old age dummy (more than 75 years old), Contracted land. 
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Table 8  Comparison of Marginal Product and Market Value 
 
marginal
product of
labor
estimated
market wage
marginal
product of
labor
estimated
market wage
marginal
product of
labor
estimated
market wage
marginal
product of
labor
estimated
market wage
Sample size
Mean 861 1,191 72 1,015 1,060 1,567 466 1,568
S. D. 1,114 437 83 520 1,853 220 465 250
t-test by rent type
marginal
product of
land
actual rental
fee
marginal
product of
land
actual rental
fee
marginal
product of
land
actual rental
fee
marginal
product of
land
actual rental
fee
Sample size
Mean 1,812 323 495 372 865 249 401 544
S. D. 1,175 190 635 147 515 170 296 216
t-test by rent type 7.206*** 9.216***
-3.785***
-32.019***
-3.347*** -11.698***
7.822*** 0.955
5.107*** 0.229
7.149***
4.554***
-3.506***
187
-2.256** -17.576***
-4.388*** -8.591***
40
-1.754*
7.169*** 4.141***
paired sample t-test
Wilcoxon signed-rank test
paired sample t-test
Wilcoxon signed-rank test
37 25 28 77
63 98
Deqing
rent-in non-rent-in rent-in
Fenghua
non-rent-in
 
Notes: *** significant at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level.
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Appendix  Estimated Results of Multinomial Logit Model 
Contracted land -0.004 -0.269 ** 0.060 * 0.021
(-0.046) (-2.420) (1.733) (0.454)
Number of total workers -0.245 0.268 0.231 * 0.489 ***
(-1.635) (1.620) (1.858) (3.457)
Age -0.178 0.109 0.040 0.170
(-1.392) (0.626) (0.601) (1.196)
Age*Age 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.002
(1.287) (-0.870) (-0.550) (-1.226)
Years of education 0.042 -0.080 0.015 -0.016
(0.725) (-1.407) (0.334) (-0.313)
CCP Dummy 1.045 *** 0.537 -0.250 0.657
(2.954) (1.325) (-0.579) (1.479)
Ratio of higher education -0.886 -1.014 0.281 -0.712
(-0.888) (-0.970) (0.220) (-0.488)
Child Dummy 1 0.428 -0.790 * 0.131 0.073
(0-4) (1.082) (-1.748) (0.389) (0.185)
Old age Dummy -0.180 -0.033 0.164 -0.887 *
(-0.375) (-0.058) (0.564) (-1.766)
Health index 0.311 0.349 0.011 0.425
(1.511) (1.617) (0.048) (1.402)
Land Gini 0.745 16.367 ** 1.234 3.490
(0.146) (2.355) (0.184) (0.404)
Village wage rate 0.009 -0.012 0.040 * 0.022
(0.882) (-0.955) (1.801) (1.127)
Cultivated land per household 3.214 *** -0.520 -0.754 -0.578
(2.695) (-0.374) (-1.021) (-0.775)
Geographic dummy (hilly) -2.548 *** 2.756 ** -1.857 *** -1.609 *
(-3.214) (2.383) (-3.314) (-1.674)
Geographic dummy (mountaino -2.252 *** 2.703 ** -0.034 -1.261
(-2.566) (2.281) (-0.037) (-0.959)
Township Dummy 1 -0.925 1.487 ** 2.170 *** 0.715
(-1.428) (2.000) (3.990) (1.129)
Township Dummy 2 -1.596 3.855 *** 2.817 *** 1.952
(-1.568) (2.976) (3.076) (1.520)
Intercept 4.064 -10.139 * -5.241 -9.161 *
(1.030) (-1.787) (-1.639) (-1.805)
Observation
Wald test
Pseudo R2
Fenghua Deqing
j=1
coefficient
j=3
coefficient
(rent-out) (rent-in) (rent-out) (rent-in)
j=1
coefficient
j=3
coefficient
0.164
422
100.74***
0.155
383
100.05***
 
Notes: 1) Values of z-statistics are reported in the parentheses with *** significant at 1% level, ** at 
5% level, and * at 10% level. 
      2) Baseline of the estimation is autarky households (j=2). 
